This paper studies a class of dynamic Stackelberg games under open-loop information structure with constrained linear agent dynamics and quadratic utility functions. We show two important properties for this class of dynamic Stackelberg games. First, we prove that under mild conditions, the optimal control of individual agents at the solution of the Stackelberg game coincides with the solution to the team problem, where all agents cooperatively achieve the coordinator's objective. Second, we show that the the agent's control at each time step is non-increasing with respect to the coordinator's control at the same step, and non-decreasing with respect the coordinator's control at other steps. These properties enable us to develop an algorithm that converges to the globally optimal solution to the dynamic Stackelberg game. The proposed algorithm is illustrated by two demand response applications: the coordination of electric vehicle charging and the coordination of thermostatically controlled loads. Numerical examples are shown to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed approach.
Introduction
The Stackelberg game, first proposed by Von Stackelberg [1] , features a hierarchy of decision making: the leader makes control decisions first, after which the followers observe the leader's control and act correspondingly. Due to its diverse applications, Stackelberg game has attracted considerable research attentions in various fields, such as economics [1] , [2] , networks [3] , [4] , [5] , [6] , demand response [7] , [8] , among others. Many of these works primarily focus on static Stackelberg game. On the other hand, the concept of Stackelberg strategy in dynamic games was first introduced in [9] and [10] . Different from static games, the solution to dynamic Stackelberg game depends on the information structure in the game [11] (open-loop, closed-loop, feedback, etc.). For open-loop information structure, necessary conditions have been derived based on the minimum principle for both continuous-time [10] and discrete-time systems [12] , [11, Chap. 7] . When applied to unconstrained linear quadratic Stackelberg games, these necessary conditions can be simplified to a two-point boundary-value problem, which can be solved via various numerical algorithms [13] , [14] , [15] , [16] . However, when the lower level problem has state or control constraints, these Email addresses: li.2886@osu.edu (Sen Li), zhang@ece.osu.edu (Wei Zhang), jianming.lian@pnnl.gov (Jianming Lian), karanjit.kalsi@pnnl.gov (Karanjit Kalsi).
constraints become complementarity constraints in the leader's optimization problem, which is hard to address even for scalar linear quadratic Stackelberg games. This paper focuses on a class of discrete-time constrained linear quadratic Stackelberg games under open-loop information structure. In the Stackelberg game, each agent has a quadratic utility function with respect to its control, and its dynamics can be well approximated as a linear scalar system with both state and control constraints. The formulation is partly motivated by a class of dynamic resource allocation problems where a coordinator allocates resources to self-interested agents to achieve group objectives over a finite discrete-time horizon. It captures the essence of a wide range of engineering applications. For example, many demand response problems involve determining prices to efficiently allocate energy to achieve group objectives. The demand response assets, such as thermostatically controlled loads [17] , [18] , electric vehicles [19] , [20] and energy storage devices [21] , [22] can be well approximated as constrained scalar linear systems with control input representing the energy allocated to the asset during each control period. When the owners of these assets have quadratic utility functions, such coordination problems can be modeled as constrained linear quadratic Stackelberg games.
The considered Stackelberg game problem poses several challenges. From control perspectives, the state and control constraints in the lower level problem introduce com-plementarity constraints into the leader's optimal control problem, making the optimality conditions rather difficult to solve. From the optimization viewpoint, the considered Stackelberg game can be viewed as a Mathematical Program with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC) [23] , [24] , [25] . However, the following challenges arise from this perspective. First, transforming the dynamic Stackelberg game to an MPEC problem is not practical if the number of control periods in the game is large, which directly contributes to the dimension of the control vectors. Second, the coordination problem typically involves a large number of followers (i.e., 1000 electric vehicles). In this case, even if the number of control periods is not large, the decision variables still have rather high dimensions, making existing MPEC algorithms numerically intractable. Third, the overall optimization problem is non-convex. Therefore, the globally optimal solution for such problem is numerically hard to obtain. This paper develops a general solution method that can efficiently find the globally optimal solution to the constrained linear quadratic Stackelberg game. It contains several important theoretical contributions. First, we prove that under mild conditions, the optimal control of individual agents at the solution of the Stackelberg game coincides with the solution to the team problem, where all agents cooperatively achieve the coordinator's objective. This enables us to derive the optimality conditions based on the team problem instead of the Stackelberg games, which has complementarity constraints that are hard to address. These optimality conditions constitute a nonlinear complimentariry problem where the underliying function is continuous and non-differentiable. To solve these optimality conditions, a key novel contribution of this paper is that we show the lower level optimal solution at each time step is non-increasing with respect to the coordinator's control at the same time step, and non-decreasing with respect to the coordinator's control at other time steps. This monotone property ensures that for any solution violating the optimality conditions, there exists an update that improves this solution in the sense that more components of the optimality conditions are satisfied. Based on the monotone property, an algorithm is proposed, which converges to the globally optimal solution to the Stackelberg game.
Aside from these theoretical results, we also study two important applications of the proposed dynamic Stackelberg game. The first one is on the coordination of electric vehicles (EVs) and the second one concerns the coordination of thermostatically controlled loads (TCLs). In both cases the participating agent is charged a price per unit of energy, and chooses the energy consumption schedule to maximize an objective function that represents a trade-off between his comfort level and energy cost. The coordinator, on the other hand, wishes to maximize the total utility of all participating agents (EVs/TCLs) subject to a total energy constraint. As electric vehicles and thermostatically controlled loads are among the most representative types of responsive loads, these two applications are important for the systematic design and analyze of coordination strategies that promote efficient operations of the electric grid. In this paper, we validate our proposed algorithm using these two examples. Simulation results demonstrate that our algorithm can effectively find the optimal solution to the dynamic Stackelberg game.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The problem is formulated in Section II. The theoretical properties of the problem is discussed in Section III, and an efficient algorithm is proposed to compute the solution in Section IV. Section V presents numerical examples to illustrate the proposed method.
Problem Formulation
Consider an energy allocation problem where the coordinator allocates energy to N self-interested responsive demands via pricing to achieve group objectives over K discrete control periods. Let N = {1, . . . , N } and K = {1, . . . , K}. This problem can be formulated as a dynamic Stackelberg game. The rest of this section provides a formal mathematical formulation of this problem.
Agent Dynamics
Denote z i (t) ∈ R as the system state of the ith agent. Denote t k as the beginning of the kth control period. Let e k i ∈ R be the control (energy allocation) of the ith agent during the kth period. We assume that e represents the maximum amount of energy that can be allocated to agent i during each period. We also assume that the state z i (t k ) stays inside [z i ,z i ] over the entire control horizon. The dynamics of the ith agent can be captured by the following discretetime constrained linear scalar system:
In the above dynamic model, A i is constant, while B k i and C k i can be time-varying. In addition, we impose the following assumption on the parameters:
In other words, we require that A i is strictly positive and the value of B k i at different time steps have the same sign. The above model can be used to describe or approximate the dynamics of many demand response assets, such as thermostatically controlled loads [17] , [18] , [26] , [27] , electric vehicles [19] , [20] , [28] , energy storage devices [21] , [22] , [29] , among others. In real-life applications, z i (t k ) can be room temperature of the thermostatically controlled loads or the state of charge of the batteries. Detailed application examples will be given in the simulation section.
Individual Agent Utility
In this problem, each self-interested agent makes control decisions in response to the coordinator's control
To model this decision making process, we first define a stage-additive valuation function V k i : R → R to quantify the user's level of satisfaction at each time step. This valuation function is assumed to take the following quadratic form:
where β k i < 0 and d k i is the desired state for agent i during the kth period. In addition to the valuation function, there is a payment associated with the assigned energy (agent control) at each stage, which we denote as p k c e k i . In this setup, the coordinator's control can be interpreted as the price for using one unit of energy during the kth period.
The utility of each agent is the sum of the stage valuation function minus the payment, which can be represented as follows:
where
) and e i = (e 1 i , . . . , e K i ). After the coordinator's control is announced, each individual agent determines the control e i to maximize the individual utility U i . This can be modeled as the following optimization problem:
Problem (4) is strictly concave with respect to vector e i . This is because the utility function is strictly concave with respect to (z i (t 1 ), . . . , z i (t K )), and (z i (t 1 ), . . . , z i (t K )) is linear with respect to e i . Therefore, there exists a unique solution to (4) for any given sequence p c . Let h i (p c ) denote this optimal solution for a given control vector p c . We call h i : R K → R K the agent response function, which maps the coordinator's control to the individual agent responses.
Problem Statement
The coordinator's objective is to maximize the social welfare subject to a total resource constraint. Let φ k : R → R be the cost for the overall system to procure energy at the kth period. Assume that φ k is differentiable and convex. The coordinator's optimization problem can be formulated as follows:
. (5) subject to:
where D in (6b) denote the total resource available, and (6e) is the equilibrium constraint indicating that the energy allocation maximizes the individual utility for a given p c . In plain words, the problem of this paper is to determine the coordinator's control vector p c to solve the optimization problem (5).
The coordinator's problem (5) essentially constitutes a dynamic Stackelberg game [11] , where the coordinator chooses control actions to maximize the social welfare, after which the agents determine individual control actions to maximize individual utilities. With the equilibrium constraint (6e), it can be also viewed as a Mathematical Program with Equilibrium Constraint (MPEC). The MPEC problem is rather challenging to solve as its constraint set is implicitly determined by the complementarity systems. Such constraints are often ill-posed in the sense that they do not satisfy the common constraint qualification conditions, which is the key condition to guarantee the convergence of the standard nonlinear programming algorithms. Therefore, these standard algorithms are not directly applicable to the MPEC problems. In addition, our problem (5) is more complicated than standard MPEC problems as its lower level requires solving a large number of constrained optimal control problems for the dynamic agents.
The Theoretical Properties
This section derives several important properties for the Stackelberg game problem. In particular, we show that the energy allocation at the solution of the coordinator's problem (5) coincides with the solution to the team problem, where all agents cooperatively achieve the coordinator's objective. Furthermore, we also show that the agent response function h i (·) is monotone with respect to the coordinator's control. These two properties are crucial for the development of the numerical algorithm proposed in Section 4.
Relation to Team Problem
To deal with the equilibrium constraints (6e), in this secsection we show that the optimal solution to the Stackelberg game (5) can be related to the solution for the team problem. This enables us to characterize the optimal solutions based on the team problem instead of the original Stackelberg game. To this end, consider the following problem:
subject to:
This problem (7) is often referred to as the team problem [11] , [30] , [31] . Let e
Γ ) be the solution to the team problem. We call e Γ i the team solution. In the team problem (7), all the agents cooperatively try to achieve the coordinator's control objective. In contrast, in the coordinator's optimization problem (5), the agents only care about his own utility (they may not cooperate). Therefore, the team optimal solution provides an upper bound for the attainable social welfare: the realizable social welfare is always less than or equal to the team optimal solution. This can be verified by noting that while the coordinator's problem and the team problem can be both regarded as maximizing over (p c , e 1 , . . . , e N ), the coordinator's problem (5) has one more constraint (6e) than the team problem (7).
To further discuss the relations between the Stackelberg game (5) and the team problem (7), we introduce the following definition:
An important property of our Stachelberg problem (5) is the existence of a control vector that realizes the team optimal solution. This result can be summarized as the following proposition: Proof. To prove this result, we first investigate the optimality conditions for the team problem (7). Then we construct the coordinator's control p c such that the team solution equals the solution to the individual utility maximization problem (4).
The team problem (7) is strictly convex, and the state constraint (8a) can be written in terms of the control. Therefore the KKT conditions for (7) is as follows: there exist unique multipliers ξ k ,λ 
are non-negative satisfying the following complementarity conditions: On the other hand, since the individual utility maximization problem (4) is also strictly convex, the necessary and sufficient optimality condition is that for ∀k ∈ K, there exist unique Lagrangian multipliers λ
and η k i are non-negative scalar satisfying the following conditions:
where w k i,hi(pc) is the state trajectory corresponding to the control h i (p c ). As p c is determined by the coordinator, we construct the following coordinator control and multipliers that satisfy (11) and (12):
It can be verified that due to (9) and (10), this multiplier set satisfies (11) and (12) 
Therefore, this indicates that e Γ i is the optimal solution to the individual utility maximization problem (4) when p c = (p
. Similar to the proof of Proposition 1, we can derive the sufficient conditions that the coordinator's optimal control should satisfy, which is summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 The coordinator's control p c realizes the team optimal solution if it satisfies the following for all k ∈ K, :
Proof. To prove this result, we first investigate the optimality condition for the individual utility maximization problem for a given price p c . Then we construct a solution/multiple pair so that the solution to (4) (11) and (12). Now we construct the following solution/multiplier pair for the team problem:
As p c satisfies (14) , it can be verified that the constructed solution/multiplier pair satisfies (9) and (10) . This indicates that any p c satisfying (14) can realize the team optimal solution.
2
Since the team problem provides an attainable upper bound for the Stackelberg problem, if we can find a sequence that satisfies (14) , then this sequence p c is the solution to the original Stackelberg problem (5).
Monotone Property of the Agent Response Function
The proposed condition (14) can be used to verify whether a given control vector p c is the solution to problem (5). However, since p c is implicitly determined by the complementarity systems (14) , this condition can not be directly used to derive the solution to the Stackelberg game (5). To develop an algorithm that efficiently compute this solution, we investigate the monotone property of the agent response function h i in this subsection.
Let 1 k = (0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . . , 0) be an indicator vector of dimension K, whose kth element is 1 and all other elements are 0. The goal of this section is to prove the following monotone property:
Definition 2 (monotonicity) h i (·) is monotone with respect to p c , if for ∀p c ∈ R K , the following holds
for ∀k ∈ K, ∀j = k and ∀ > 0.
In other words, we want to show that the agent response function h k i (p c ) monotonically decreases with respect to p k c , and monotonically increases with respect to p j c for all j = k. To prove the monotone property, we first prove that it suffices to have the local monotone property, which can be formally defined as follows:
The notation¯ pc is to emphasize its dependence on p c . The local monotone property appears weaker than the monotone property in the sense that it only requires the property to hold within a small neighborhood of p c . The following lemma shows that the monotone property and local monotone property are equivalent. 
To show the monotone property holds, we need to extend this result to >¯ pc . The idea is to construct a sequence, and establish a series of inequalities to compare p c + 1 k and p c through this sequence. Let F be an open over for the set [0, ], defined as follows:
As the set [0, ] is compact, there exists a finite subcover, which we denote as F = {F 0 , F 1 , . . . , F s }. Based on the definition, each F i can be written as F i = (f i ,f i ). Without loss of generality, let f 1 ≤ f 2 ≤ · · · ≤ f s , and assume that ∈ F s . Therefore, based on (16), we have f s < < f s +¯ pc+f s . Due to local monotone property at p c +f s 1 k , the following inequality
. Note that f s ∈ F s−1 , the same analysis can be applied to f s , giving h 
However, as¯ depends on p c,i , this sequence may converge before getting close to p c + 1 k , in which case the last one of the series of inequalities does not hold.
Based on the result of Lemma 1, to prove the monotone property of h i (p c ), it suffices to show that this property holds within a small neighborhood of any given p c . To this end, we first explore the KKT conditions (11) for the individual utility maximization problem (4). We can solve this condition and write
This result is summarized in the following lemma:
Lemma 2 The optimal solution h i (p c ) to individual utility maximization problem (4) satisfies the following equation:
In equation (17),ρ
and ρ k i are defined as follows:
where λ Proof. To solve the KKT conditions for (4), we first note that the state of the linear system (1) can be written as a function of control (24) . Plug (24) into (4), then the KKT conditions can be written as (11) and (12) 
2 , the KKT conditions (11) can be reduced to a set of equations on e i . We can solve this equation set and derive the following:
where L k is defined as:
This equation can be further simplified to (17) .
If the individual utility maximization problem (4) is unconstrained, then the multipliers (λ k 
then we have the following result:
Proof. Since the individual utility maximization problem (4) is strictly convex, to find its solution, we only need to construct a multiplier/solution pair that satisfies KKT conditions (11) and the slackness condition (12) . Let¯ = λ m i . We consider the following multiplier/solution pair: decrease λ m i by , while all other multipliers and solutions remain unchanged. It can be verified that this multiplier/solution pair satisfies (11) and (12) . Therefore, h i (p c,m ) = h i (p c ) is the solution to (4). This completes the proof. Furthermore, we note that the individual utility maximization problem (4) is strictly convex. It is wellknown that the solution to a strictly convex parametric quadratic programming problem is continuous with respect to the parameters [32] , [33] . This result indicates that any inactive constraints corresponding to p c is still inactive after a sufficiently small perturbation is applied. Since h i (·) is a continuous function, the proof of this lemma directly follows from the definition of continuity, and is therefore omitted in this paper. Due to Lemma 3 and Lemma 4, when a sufficiently small perturbation 1 m is applied to p c , we can assume λ Next, we investigate how the multipliers affect the optimal solution. First, we observe that the coupling between multipliers at different time steps are formed through a chain. More specifically, based on (17) m is applied to p c , the coupling chain is interrupted at the mth step. This indicates that intuitively the multipliers before the mth step and those after the mth step can be separately constructed to satisfy the KKT conditions (11) and (12) . This result can be summarized as the following two propositions: 
where ρ 
Proof. Since h i (p c,m ) is the optimal solution to (4), based on the KKT conditions, there exists a set of nonnegative multipliers λ i,m = 0, it can be verified that as long as is sufficiently small, this solution/multiplier pair satisfies the KKT conditions (11) and (12), and is therefore also a solution to (4) . This is a contradiction with the uniqueness of h i (p c,m ). The proof for this proposition is omitted, since it is similar to that of Proposition 3.
Based on Proposition 3 and Proposition 4, we discuss the following two properties regarding the multipliers of the state constraint.
Proof. Using the result of Proposition 3, we prove this result by constructing a multiplier/solution pair that satisfies the KKT conditions (22) and (23) Proof. Using the result of Proposition 4, we prove this result by constructing a multiplier/solution pair that satisfies the KKT conditions (22) and (23) (17) and (12) for all k ∈ K, the constructed multipliers and the resulting solution e k i (k ≥ m + 1) also satisfy (22) and (23) for all k ≥ m + 2. Therefore, we only need to verify the slackness conditions (23) 
= 0. Therefore, as long as is sufficiently small, (23a), (23b) and (23d) clearly hold for k = m+1. To verify (23c), we investigate the state trajectory w k i,ei under the constructed multipliers. According to the linear dynamics (1), the state can be written in terms of control as
where σ k i is a constant not depending on e i . Plug (22) into this relation, we have the following:
Note that w Proof. To prove this result, we constructively find the solution to (4) corresponding to p c,m . We propose the following procedure to construct the multiplier/solution pair that satisfies the KKT conditions (22) and (23) has increased. According to (22) and (21), the impact of this increase on γ n i is equivalent to the impact of increasing p n+1 c by the same amount. Therefore, we can apply Proposition 5 and construct the multipliers for k ≤ n using the same approach in the proof of Proposition 5, where the solutions remain unchanged. For γ n i = 0, we let all the multipliers and solutions for with k ≤ n remain unchanged. Up to now we have obtained a new set of multipliers. Note that based on (22) , there may exist e k i >ē k i for some n ≤ k ≤ m after this process. Therefore, we start over from m − 1, and repeat this entire process. After each iteration, the obtained multiplier is strictly increasing. On the other hand it is upper bounded. If it is not upper bounded, i.e., λ k i is unbounded, then based on (22) i is also unbounded for some n ≤ j ≤ m. However, it can be verified that in the proposed procedure, e k i is always bounded for all n ≤ k ≤ m. Therefore, this procedure monotonically converges, and it converges to a multiplier/solution pair satisfying (22) and (23) 
for all e i ∈ F i , where
) is the state trajectory corresponding to control h i (p c ) and w k i,hi(pc) is defined as (24) . Let e i = h i (p c,m ). Since h i (p c,m ) ∈ F i , we plug it in (26) and have the following:
(27) In addition, based on the definition, h i (p c,m ) is the optimal solution to the individual utility maximization problem (4) under the coordinator control p c,m . Therefore, we have:
for all e i ∈ F i . Plugging e i = h i (p c ) into (28), we have the following:
By rearranging the terms in (27) and (29), these two inequalities lead to the following:
This indicates that h ,m ) , which completes the proof. 2
The Proposed Algorithm
This section presents an efficient algorithm to iteratively compute the solution to the optimality condition (14) .
In each iteration of the proposed algorithm, we categorize the time index K into three sets: S 1 where the aggregate energy exceeds the total energy constraint, S 2 where the aggregate energy equals the total energy constraint, and S 3 where the aggregate energy is less than the total energy constraint. During each iteration, we update p k c for all k ∈ S 1 ∪ S 2 so that the aggregate energy for all k ∈ S 1 ∪ S 2 equals the total energy constraint. The existence of this update is ensured due to the monotone property of h i (·). We show that the set S 1 ∪ S 2 keeps expanding after each iteration, and eventually converges to the optimal solution satisfying (14) . The proposed algorithm is summarized in Algorithm 1. This algorithm is terminated when p c in two subsequent iterations are close enough.
Algorithm 1: the Main Algorithm
Initialization: I = 0, initial price p c = p w . 1: while convergence criteria not satisfied do 2:
4:
Update the coordinator's control: p c = p c + d.
5:
I = I + 1. 6: end while Output: The optimal p c and the index set S 1 and S 2 .
The convergence properties of Algorithm 1 can be formally stated as follows:
Theorem 3 In Algorithm 1, p c converges to the optimal control vector satisfying (14) . In addition, it converges in at most K steps, i.e., I ≤ K.
Proof. Let S = S 1 ∪ S 2 . Denote S I 1 as the set S 1 after Ith iteration, and the same convention goes to S 2 and S 3 . Based on step 3 of the algorithm (31), we have S
= ∅ and the algorithm converges. Therefore, before the algorithm converges, we always have |S I+1 | ≥ |S I | + 1. This indicates that after each iteration, S is expanded by at least one element. Since |S 1 | ≤ K, the algorithm converges in at most K iterations. Moreover, when it converges, S I 1 = ∅, and thus the resulting solution satisfies (14) . This completes the proof.
The above result states that the proposed algorithm converges to the optimal solution to (5) in at most K step. However, to this point there are still two important questions: does there exist d that satisfies (31) in step 3? If yes, how to derive d? To answer these questions, we propose a constructive procedure to derive d based on the monotone property of h i . Let r = |S|, and denote each element of S as k 1 < k 2 . . . < k r , then the proposed procedure can be summarized as Algorithm 2. This algorithm is terminated if p c in two subsequent iterations are close enough.
Algorithm 2: Implement Step 3 of Algorithm 1
Initialization: coordinator's control p c and set S = (k 1 , . . . , k r ). These inputs are from Step 1 and Step 2 of Algorithm 1. 1: while convergence criteria not satisfied do 2: for j=1:r do 3:
Update the energy price:
end for 6: evaluate h i (p c ) 7: end while Output: The coordinator's control sequence p c . Algorithm 2 increases the elements of p c one by one until the convergence criteria is satisfied. Due to the monotone property of h i , this algorithm converges to the solution to (31) in Step 3 of Algorithm 1. This result can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 7 The coordinator's control p c in Algorithm 2 converges to the solution satisfying (31) .
Proof. We prove that p c monotonically converges to the solution to (31) . First, it is clear that each element of p c monotonically increases during each iteration. Second, due to Proposition 1, there exists a solution to the coordinator's problem (5) satisfying (14) . We denote this solution asp c . It suffices to prove that p c in Algorithm 2 is element-wise upper bounded byp c . Here we prove this result by contradiction. Assume p c is not element-wise upper bounded byp c . Since Algorithm 1 starts from p w and the input of Algorithm 2 comes from the first two steps of Algorithm 1, Algorithm 2 also starts with p w , which is less than p c element-wise. Therefore in the be- Therefore, p c in Algorithm 2 is element-wise upper bounded byp c , and thus the algorithm converges. It is easy to verify that the solution of this algorithm satisfies (31) when it converges. This completes the proof.
Remark 2 To execute these algorithms, the coordinator needs to know the parameters of agent dynamics. This may raise privacy concern: the agents may be reluctant to share private information with the coordinator. Here we clarify this concern from the following two perspectives: first, in some applications the coordinator can either estimate these parameters based on historic measurements [34] , or through iterative information exchange [35] . In both cases the proposed framework is directly applicable. Second, when the coordinator has incomplete information, the coordinator can use mechanism design approach to deal with the private information. In this case, the load parameters in this paper are the user bids in the mechanism, and the work proposed in this paper can be an important sub-problem of a big mechanism design problem. Interested readers can find more details from [36] .
Demand Response Applications
In this section, we apply the proposed approach to two applications: the charging of EV fleet, and the coordination of a group of TCLs. Realistic simulation results are presented to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed approach.
EV Fleet Charging
In this example, a coordinator purchases energy from the wholesale energy market, and determines a price vector to efficiently allocate energy to a group of self-interested EVs over a finite discrete-time horizon. The EVs randomly arrive at and depart from the charging lot, and the vehicle should be fully charged before it departs. In this scenario, we assume that each random variable for different vehicles (including the arrival time, departure time, initial state of charge (SOC), battery capacity and the maximum charging rate) is independently and identically distributed. Furthermore, we assume that the EV owner prefers to receive a flat charging profile during his stay. For instance, if a vehicle requests 6 kWh energy over 30 minutes, he prefers to receive 1 kWh for every 5-minute period, i.e., e i = (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1), to receiving a charging profile that is concentrated in a few periods, i.e., e i = (0, 3, 0, 3, 0, 0). To capture the user preference, we define a valuation function that quadratically penalizes the deviations of its SOC from a reference SOC trajectory, which corresponds to a charging profile that splits the energy requests of each vehicle evenly between its arrival and departure. Aside from the valuation function, the vehicle is also charged a price per unit energy. The valuation function minus the payment is the utility function for each user, which can be modeled as (3). The individual user chooses energy consumption schedule to maximize the individual utility function, while the coordinator tries to maximize the total utility of all users minus the energy procurement cost. In our example, the energy procurement cost φ k (·) is simply the wholesale energy price multiplied by the total energy. This problem can be modeled as (5), with the battery dynamics of each vehicle as follows:
where z i (t k ) denotes SOC of the battery,z i is the battery capacity, and e k i is the assigned energy in the kth period. Note that if the vehicle is not on-site at time k, then e k i = 0.
We comment that we do not assume the coordinator knows the realization of the random variables, such as arrival time, departure time, initial SOC, etc. Instead, he only knows their probability distribution. We argue that for a large population of EVs, the probability distribution contains sufficient information for the coordinator to determine the optimal price. This is because of the following: based on the optimality conditions (14) , the optimal solution to the Stackelberg game (5) only depends on the aggregated energy response
The aggregated energy response is stochastic as its dependence on the random variables. However, for a large number of EVs, the variance of
) is typically small due to the law of large numbers. Therefore, if we simulate the EV fleet and determine the unit price based on the aggregated energy response of the simulated fleet, then the derived price can be applied to the real EV fleet to induce an aggregated energy response that is close to the response of the simulated EV fleet. This indicates that the unit price derived based on simulated EVs is close to optimal for the real EV fleet.
In the simulation, we consider the 5-minute control period with a planning horizon of 6 hours. Two realizations of the EV fleet data (each realization has 1000 EVs) are generated with the following random variables uniformly drawn from proper ranges: the arrival times of each vehicle (over 6 hours), the length of stay for each vehicle (between 2 hours and 4 hours), the battery capacity of the EV (between 15 kWh and 20 kWh) , the maximum charging rate for the fleet (between 6 kW and 8 kW), the initial SOC for the EV (between 0% and 20%), and the parameters β k i for individual utilities. We refer to these two sets of data as the simulated EV fleet and the real EV fleet, respectively. Based on preceding discussions, the optimal price is derived with the simulated EV fleet and then applied to the real EV fleet for verification. To obtain a close-to 100% SOC at the end, the coefficient β k i at departure is set to be significantly smaller than at other steps (note that β k i < 0). In addition, we assume that the power capacity limit is 3.5 MW, which corresponds to a 5 minute energy bound D = 3.5 MWh/12 = 291 kWh. The cost function φ k is assumed to be linear: the cost function φ k (·) is simply the wholesale energy price multiplied by the total energy consumption. The wholesale price data is derived from PJM's energy market [37] . In our paper, we refer to it as the base price, which corresponds to p w .
The simulation uses the wholesale energy price data between 11 : 00 AM and 17 : 00 PM. We randomly select a vehicle with its reference SOC trajectory and the optimal SOC trajectory shown in Figure 1 . This vehicle arrives at 11 : 55AM with an initial SOC of 17%, and departs at 15 : 45 PM. The optimal SOC trajectory is close to the reference, and the vehicle gets fully charged before departure. The optimal price and the base price trajectory are shown in Figure 2 . Under the optimal price, the aggregated energy response for the simulated EV fleet and the real EV fleet is shown in Figure 3 . These two figures indicate that the derived solution is the optimal solution for the simulated EV fleet, as it satisfies the optimality conditions (14) : when the clearing price (coordinator's control) equals the base price, the aggregate energy of the simulated EV fleet is less than the total energy budget, and when the clearing price is greater than the base price, the total energy of the simulated EV fleet equals the energy budget. In addition, it is clear that the aggregated energy of the real EV fleet is very close to that of the simulated fleet, indicating that the derived price is close to optimal for the real fleet. 
Coordination of Thermostatically Controlled Loads
Similar to the EV example, we consider a coordinator who purchases energy from the wholesale energy market and allocates energy to a group of TCLs via pricing over a finite discrete-time horizon. Each user has a desired temperature and a valuation function that quadratically penalizes the deviations from desired temperature. Aside from valuation function, the user is also charged a price per unit energy. The valuation function minus the payment is the utility function for each user, which can be modeled as (3) . We assume that the load parameters and individual utilities are known to the coordinator. The individual user tries to maximize the individual utility function, while the coordinator wishes to maximize the total utility of all users minus the energy procurement cost. The energy procurement cost φ k (·) is the wholesale energy price multiplied by the total energy. This problem can be modeled as (5) , with the linear discrete-time system dynamics presented below.
Dynamic of TCLs
The thermal dynamics of TCL are typically characterized by the continuous time Equivalent Thermal Parameter (ETP) model [26] . The most widely used model in the literature is the first-order ETP model [17] , [18] , [26] , [27] , which can be summarized as follows:
where z i (t) denotes the room temperature,Ã i is a constant, andB i on andB i of f are time-varying due to the outside environment disturbances. Now we show that the continuous time model (32) can be transformed to the discrete-time model (1) under the following control policy: during each period (e.g., 5 minutes), the system is on from t k−1 to T 1 (to be determined), off from T 1 to T 2 , and on from T 2 to t k , where T 1 and T 2 satisfy the following:
where α is the portion of time the system is on during one control period. It can be verified that the proposed control policy results in a linear discrete-time dynamic system (1), where the parameters satisfy the following: 
Note that in the above equations, A i > 0, and B k i B j i > 0, which satisfies our assumption in Section II-A.
Simulation Results
In the simulation, we generate 1000 sets of building parameters. The thermal capacity, the thermal resistance and the rated power of each load are generated based on a uniform distribution. We assume the average power of the TCL loads is 5 kW, and the feeder power capacity is 2.5 MW, and the parameters of the agent utility function are generated based on a uniform distribution.
The ETP model parameters depend on the air temperature [26] . Here we use the air temperature data for Columbus, OH, obtained from [38] . Similar to example 1, we consider a linear cost function φ k and refer to the wholesale energy price as the base price.
Simulations are run for the TCLs using the temperature record and energy price record between 11 : 00 AM and 14 : 00 PM. A TCL is randomly selected, whose state trajectory is shown in Figure 4 . Simulation result shows that the state constraint is always respected. The total energy trajectory is shown in Figure 5 . Since the feeder capacity limit is 2.5 MW, the total energy constraint during each 5-minute period is 2.5 MWh/12 = 208.3 kWh. The simulation result shows that this energy constraint is always respected throughout the entire horizon. In addition, the coordinator's control (referred to as the clearing price) and the base price are shown in Figure 6 . We observe that when there is no power congestion, the clearing price is equal to the base price. When power congestion occurs, the clearing price is higher than the base price, and the energy during the congestion period is exactly equal to the energy cap (can be verified in Figure 5) . This is consistent with the sufficient conditions for the optimal price (14).
Conclusion
This paper presents the solution to a class of constrained linear quadratic Stackelberg game. To find the Stackelberg solution, we derived an attainable upper bound for this game using the corresponding team problem. The team optimality conditions were derived, and an algorithm was proposed to compute this solution satisfying these conditions. We showed that the proposed algorithm converges to the Stackelberg solution in a few steps, and validated the proposed algorithm with two real-life applications. Future work includes extending the dynamic model to higher dimensions and designing mechanisms to deal with private information.
